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L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035)
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505
Attorneys for Defendant,
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,

REPLY BRIEF and RESPONDENT
BRIEF OF APPELLANT and
CROSS RESPONDENT
GUARDIAN TITLE

Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 890569-CA
STEPHEN S. DURISH, as receiver
and liquidator of USLIFE TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Argument Priority No. 16
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.
DEFENDANT, APPELLANT and CROSS RESPONDENT, GUARDIAN TITLE
COMPANY OF UTAH (hereinafter, "Guardian"), hereby replies to New
West

Federal

Savings

(hereinafter,

"American")

Brief

as

Respondent and Cross-Appellant as follows:

REPLY TO AMERICAN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Guardian notes that there are so many disputed material
facts that Guardian has for the Court's benefit attached as
Appendix "A" a copy of the "Statement of Facts" as presented by
American in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Record,
p. 375-387); and attached as Appendix "B" a copy of Guardian's
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"Response to the Statement of Facts" which was presented in
opposition to American's

Motion for Summary Judgment (Record,

p. 513-521).

1.
53.),

American in its "Statement of Facts" (1(1., 52., and

"Brief

of

Respondent/Cross-Appellant"

(hereinafter,

"American's Brief"), while not directly controverting Guardian's
"Statement of Facts", 52. and 53., seems to suggest that the
prior commitment for title insurance was not issued correctly or
that American's loan was made well after the time the borrowers
"Strongs" obtained the loan from the credit union that gave rise
to the problem.

This of course, is not the case. As Guardian

points out, in its Statement of Facts under 52., 53., and 54.,
Guardian did issue, as agent for USLife, a commitment for title
insurance to United Savings & Loan Association, dated December
14, 1983, that accurately and fully reflected the status of the
title on that date.

(Record, P. 514, referencing Anderson

Deposition, Record, P. 808 [particularly, P. 526 and 527) •
American's statements made in their Motion for Summary Judgment
before the trial court were incorrect and not supported by the
record at the time they were made, nor are they now in this
regard (See 53., American's memorandum in support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment, Record, P. 376).
2.

American in 55. in its Statement of Facts, discloses

certain aspects of the agency contract between Guardian and
USLife

Title,

the

insurer,

and

2

attempts

to

draw

certain

conclusions from such contract.

The agency contract, which

Guardian does not deny and certainly produced

as part of

discovery is totally irrelevant to American's rights or claims.
Certainly American had no prior discovery or notice of the
agency contract, other than its knowledge that at all time
Guardian acted for and on behalf of USLife Title in issuing the
commitment of title insurance, in closing the transaction, and
in issuing the title policy after the closing. (Record, P. 376,
377) .
3.

American in 56. of its Statement of Facts, states in

pertinent part that Guardian and USLife were chosen to examine
the state of the title and to act as escrow and closing agent on
the loan. However, Americanfs reference to the Record does not
support American's claim that Guardian and USLife were "chosen
to examine the state of the title".

To the contrary, there is

no question that Guardian, as agent for USLife was expected and
required to issue a title insurance policy insuring American's
Trust Deed in a first lien position on the property; and in
fact, Guardian did just that.
4.

With respect to f7., American mischaracterizes the

escrow instructions as it did at the time of the Motion for
Summary Judgment. The escrow instructions plainly intended that
Guardian, as agent for USLife, take such steps as were necessary
to pay off junior liens or encumbrances, etc., so that it could
issue a title insurance policy, insuring the Trust Deed or
Mortgage of F.C.A., as a first lien of record (Record, P. 515;
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Anderson Deposition, Record, P. 811 - Exhibit "1", P. 532533) .
5.

With respect to 18., Guardian hotly disputes this

statement, and contends that it certainly did not become aware,
in a conscious sense, of the existence of the "Scenic Rail Trust
Deed" until after it recorded and disbursed the loan proceeds
(Record, P. 516).
6.

f9. is disputed. Guardian's officers or employees did

not become consciously aware of the existence of the Scenic Rail
Trust Deed, prior to the closing and disbursement of funds.
Moreover, the loan proceeds were primarily used to pay off an
existing first trust deed loan, in favor of Deseret Federal,
which all of the parties were aware of (Record, P. 516; and
Anderson Deposition, Record, P. 811 - Exhibit "1", P. 531).
7.

With respect to flO., Guardian disputes the facts set

forth therein (Record, P. 517, Addendum "B").
8. With respect to fll., Guardian admits that it contacted
the borrowers, Strongs, and attempted to obtain a pay off of the
credit union trust deed or other satisfaction respecting the
title discrepancy, but disputes the remaining claims (Record, P.
517, Addendum "B").
9.

With respect to fl2., Guardian does not dispute the

facts that it monitored the payments of the borrowers Strongs
for

a

short period

of time; and

thereafter,

relied upon

receiving a notice of default, because it was trustee (Record,
P. 809, Killpack Deposition, P. 40.).
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10.

With respect to fl3., the facts are hotly disputed

and American is attempting to draw conclusions from its version
or interpretation of the facts (Record, P. 517, Addendum "B").
11.

With respect to fl4., Guardian does not dispute the

facts therein, however Guardian points out that at the time the
Strongs defaulted on the loan, the balance owed was already in
excess of the original principal amount of American's loan and
the maximum limit in the policy issued by Guardian on behalf of
USLife (see Title Policy, appended as an addendum to Appellant's
Brief).
12.

Guardian does not dispute that sometime after the

default of the borrowers, Strongs, that American through its
counsel

commenced

non-judicial

foreclosure

proceedings.

However, Guardian disputes the factual implications of the
statements respecting the foreclosure report or reports that
American's counsel received (Record, P. 518, Addendum "B").
13. With respect to fl7., Guardian disputes only that the
amount for which the property was sold by the credit union was
not $30,000.00, but was less than $28,000.00 (Record, P. 519,
Addendum "B").
14.

With respect to fl8., Guardian does not dispute that

American and its independent counsel acting as Successor Trustee
received copies of both the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale
of the Scenic Rail Credit Union's foreclosure; and that counsel
for American had received a foreclosure report that listed the
credit union's trust deed, above as item number one, before the
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Trust Deed securing American as item two (Record, P. 808, Perry
Deposition - Exhibit "3").

Guardian also disputes the facts as

to whether or not counsel for American had actual present
knowledge that the Scenic Rail trust deed was a first lien on
the property, and superior to the lien of American, prior to the
completion of the foreclosure sale, by counsel for Scenic Rail
Credit Union (Record, P. 808, Perry Deposition, P. 47, Lines 21
to 24:
Q. You are referring to Exhibit 19. [Scenic Rail's
Notice of Trustee's Sale]?
A. Exhibit 19. I remember asking Susan to check and
see if this was one that we had to worry about,
meaning was this one that was foreclosing out our
interest.
15.

With respect to 519., the factual statements are

disputed (Record, P. 520, Addendum "B").
16.

With respect to 520., Guardian disputes the factual

statements (Record, P. 520; and Record, P. 527).
17.
factual

With respect to 521., Guardian hotly disputes the
statements

therein,

respecting

any

claim

of

confidentiality or attorney/client relationship having arisen
(Record, P. 520; and Record, P. 526-543, "Affidavit of L. Benson
Mabey").
18.

With respect to 522., Guardian does not deny the

authenticity

of Exhibit "H", but does dispute the factual

implications

or

statements

made

therein

(Record,

P. 520,

Addendum "B").
19.

With respect to 123., Guardian does not deny the
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authenticity

of Exhibit "I", but does dispute the factual

statements made respecting the same and the conclusions drawn
(Record, P. 520-521; and Record, P. 526-542, "Affidavit of L.
Benson Mabey).
20.

With respect to 124., Guardian does not dispute the

amounts claimed to be owing under the loan agreement with
borrowers Strongs; but Guardian points out that at this time the
amounts were in excess of the maximum coverage under the Title
Insurance Policy.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. NEITHER GUARDIAN NOR USLIFE UNDERTOOK THE
DUTIES OF AN ABSTRACTOR OF TITLE NOR HAD AN
OBLIGATION TO ACCURATELY SEARCH AND REPORT UPON THE
CONDITION OF THE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY.
Guardian argued in Point I, of its Appellant Brief, that
it was not liable for negligence in abstracting or claims
arising in tort, since the transaction was completely cast and
encompassed in contract. American argues under Point I, of its
Respondent Brief, that Guardian must be liable on theories of
tort, fraud, etc., but offers only generalities for the basis
for the contention.
American's Brief before this Court on Appeal

(like its

memorandum before the trial court) is replete with its caustic
contention that Guardian and USLife committed a fraud upon
American by issuing a title policy that had no exceptions from
coverage to the credit union trust deed.
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In other words, a

policy that conformed to American's expectations and insured its
trust

deed

as

a

first

lien

position

on

the

property.

Essentially, the argument is that Guardian and USLife did not
simply agree to insure American's title as a first trust deed
lien, but instead undertook to abstract and report upon the
status

of

the

title; and

having

made

a mistake

in such

abstracting, they are liable for the full loan amount, as though
they made the loan directly.
The question of whether or not a title insurer and/or agent
has a duty, to not only issue an insurance policy, but also to
accurately abstract and report upon the condition of the title
has now been conclusively resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in
a case that was decided following the filing of Guardian's
Appellant Brief.

Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 137

Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah, June 1990).
In Culp Construction, the Utah Supreme Court was faced
squarely with the issue as to whether or not a title insurer and
agent are subject to a contractual duty to accurately report the
status of the title as a necessary or integral part of the
closing of the loan and issuance of a title insurance contract.
The Court in deciding the issue noted that there is a split of
authority with some jurisdictions holding that title insurance
companies are held to a standard of liability associated with
abstractors.

However, the Court held that the better reasoned

approach is to consider the preliminary title report, or the
commitment for title insurance as no more than a statement of
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the terms and conditions upon which the insurer is willing to
issue its title policy; and, "Indeed, the prevailing view
remains not to impose liability in tort on a title company,"
Id*. p. 6.
The Court, in C U I P

Construction, also considered the

requirements under the insurance provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§31A-20-110(l) (1986), and determined that the duties imposed
under the applicable statutes on title insurers respecting a
reasonable search and examination of the tile are for the
purpose of sound underwriting requirements and not to impose a
duty to abstract titles and report upon the same for the benefit
of the proposed insured, separate and apart from the title
insurance contract.

The Court

definitively stated the policy for the decision:
The function, form, and character of a title
insurer is different from that of an abstractor. One
who hires a title insurance company does so for the
purpose of obtaining the assurance or guarantee of
obtaining a certain position in the chain of title
rather than for the purpose of discovering the title
status.
A title insurance company's function is
generally confined to the practice of insurance, not
to the practice of abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title
did not owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of
its status as a title insurance company.
Id.f p. 6.
While

American

cites

the

Culp

Construction

case

as

supporting its claim of tort, etc., its reliance is clearly
unfounded.

That is not to say that in an appropriate case, a

breach of other duties specially undertaken that are independent
of the insurance contract, may not give rise to causes of action
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in tort.

The Court specifically noted that this "may" be the

case, but this is the exception not the rule and this depends
upon

the

additional

peculiar

facts

and

circumstances

duties, if any, may

involved,

what

have been undertaken, and

certainly is not appropriate for summary judgment.
There is no question, based on the Utah Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Culp Construction, as well as Beck v. Farmer's
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), that without a
special factual situation, the cause of action is founded in
contract and not in tort. This makes particular sense under the
concept of title insurance, since there can be no recovery or
need for the insurance, unless a defect exists at the time the
insurance

policy

is committed

Insurance, 2d §48:111.

or

issued.

13A,

Couch on

Indeed this is true, both by virtue of

the contract of insurance which expressly excludes coverage for
defects that arise on or after the date of the policy, usually
the date of creation of the insured title interest, and by
virtue of the recording statutes applicable in Utah and other
states. There can be no indemnity claim, if a title defect does
not exist at the time the policy is issued in the first place.
The whole purpose is to protect the insured against actual loss
that may subsequently arise from a known or unknown title defect
that existed when the mortgage, deed or other interest was
placed of record, or insured.

13A, Couch on Insurance, 2d

§48:111.
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There is nothing unusual about this case, despite the
protestations
American.

and claims

of fraud

or misrepresentation by

A commitment to insure title was issued, not to

American or even its immediate privy in contract, FCA, but to
United Savings.

No contention or dispute exists that the

commitment for title insurance, even if viewed as a title
report, was fully accurate respecting the status of liens and
encumbrances against the title to the property.

In this case,

the borrower managed to obtain a loan, which was recorded
shortly before the closing of the loan that was subsequently
assigned or transferred to American.

Even though American's

counsel suggests that Guardian "knew" or had "actual knowledge"
of the existence of the trust deed securing the loan, this is
clearly not the case as of the time the Trust Deed, securing
American's indebtedness was placed of record, and the proceeds
of the loan disbursed.

If there is any doubt regarding this

fact, then it is clearly and obviously disputed (Record, P. 516,
Depositions referenced, 59.); and summary judgment was surely
not appropriate.
The trial judge definitely did not make such findings or
even seriously consider this factual issue at the time the
Summary Judgment was granted (Memorandum Decision, Appendix to
Appellant's Brief).
Decision

and

Obviously, from a review of the Memorandum

follow-up

Appellant's Brief),

Memorandum

Decision

(Appendix

to

the trial judge did not consider tort

theories or other theories; nor did the trial judge attempt to
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distinguish between Guardian and USLife Title, or offer any
explanation in holding that both Defendants were liable on the
insurance contract.

This is not a very weighty matter in most

circumstance; since the insurer is the deep-pocket, and there is
no reason to be very concerned in distinguishing between the two
parties.

However, because of the peculiar circumstances that

arose, well after the conclusion of the matter, this has become
important and a vital issue, which may require a remand by this
Court

for

further

consideration

by

the

trial

court

for

appropriate resolution.

POINT II,
NEITHER GUARDIAN OR USLIFE HAVE ANY
SPECIAL STATUTORY DUTIES SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE
TITLE INSURANCE CONTRACT.
American in Point I, Subpart "D", of its Respondent Brief,
states that USLife and Guardian breached statutory duties that
give rise to an independent cause of action, separate from the
insurance policy provisions.

It has already been noted,

that

the recent decision in Culp Construction, has determined after
an evaluation and discussion of such statutory duties under Utah
Code Ann., Title 31A, that the legislative intention was not to
impose a requirement to abstract and correctly report the status
of the title to the proposed insured, but was instead for the
purpose of sound underwriting respecting the issuance of the
insurance policy.

Nonetheless, American cites Utah Code Ann.

§31A-23-308, and related provisions for the proposition that
Guardian and USLife breached duties owed to American.
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The provisions primarily deal with an insurers and agents
responsibility, to make proper disclosures to the public, so as
not to

contribute

to unfair

competition.

Primarily, the

requirements deal with prohibitions on communications which
contain

false

or

misleading

information

relating

to

the

insurance contract.
In this case, of course, Guardian issued a perfectly
accurate title insurance commitment (accurate, even if measured
by abstracting standards) .

When Guardian on behalf of USLife

recorded American's Trust Deed and disbursed the loan proceeds,
it obviously, then had a duty to comply with the commitment and
instructions given by American to issue a title insurance policy
insuring American's Trust Deed, as a first lien against the
subject property.

Even though Guardian discovered after the

recordation of the Trust Deed and disbursement of the proceeds,
that a new trust deed in favor of Scenic Rail Credit Union had
been missed, it had no choice but to issue the insurance
indemnity policy, as bargained for by American.

The mistake,

notwithstanding, it complied with its commitment and under no
reasonable view could have done otherwise.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, American apparently seems
to miss the fact that the statutes that it relies upon, Utah
Code Ann., Title 31A, Chapter 23, was newly enacted in 1985, as
a part of the insurance recodification.

The effective date set

by the legislature was July 1, 1986 (Utah Senate Bill, No. 232
§59) .

The transactions complained about by American and the
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contract of insurance was issued on or about March to May of
1984, at least two (2) years prior to the effective date of the
statutory provisions.
It is well known and well accepted that statutory law is
not given retroactive effect, unless the legislature expressly
declared an intention to do so. Washington National Ins. Co. v.
Sherwood Assoc. , 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Ct. App. June 1990) . In
this case the legislature was not merely silent about the
effective date and application of the chapter, but instead chose
and effective date that was more than a year from the date of
enactment.

There is no question and no doubt that these

statutory sections do not apply in any respect to the claims
asserted by American.

POINT III. GUARDIAN ACTED AT ALL TIMES AS DISCLOSED
AGENT FOR AND ON
BEHALF OF THE INSURER, USLIFE
TITLE, AND GUARDIAN IS NOT SEPARATELY LIABILE TO
AMERICAN.
American under Point I. "E", of its Brief, states that
Guardian is liable for its own action in contract and tort.
American

appears

to

agree

with

Guardian

on

the

general

proposition, universally embraced by case law, that an agent is
not liable for contracts undertaken on behalf of a disclosed
principal, within
however, goes

the

on to

scope

of his authority.

state that

an

agent

American,

can be liable,

independently, of the principal for separate acts of fraud or
torts

committed

in connection with

his

activities

or for

separate and independent contracts that an agent undertakes on
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its own behalf. American then cites certain cases and treatises
for this proposition, including two Utah cases. Such cases and
treatises deal specifically with independent torts committed by
the

agent

that

clearly

violate

separate

duties,

whether

performed under the auspices of the principal or not. Guardian
has no quarrel whatsoever with this general proposition cited by
American.
Guardian, however, fails to see how this relates to the
clear contractual obligation undertaken by Guardian, as agent
for USLife, in this particular case.

It has already been noted

that some jurisdictions hold an agent liabile along with the
insured for negligence in abstracting as an implied duty arising
from the insurance.

However, the Utah Supreme Court in Culp

Construction has laid to rest any notions that title insurance
is anything other than a clear indemnity contract to protect
against adverse claims existing of record in the title.

Thus,

the Court has clearly stated that there is no tort duty or duty
of abstracting or disclosure separate and independent from the
contract of insurance, unless the duty arises out of special
facts or relations involved in the case.
In this case, there was no request whatsoever by American
or its predecessor for an updated title report or commitment
prior to the closing, disbursement of the loan proceeds and
recordation of the Trust Deed, which was insured.
there

is

no

dispute

that

the

original

Moreover,

commitment

issued

approximately three (3) months prior to the actual loan closing
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was accurate in all respects.

In this case, what American

bargained to get was exactly what it did get, a title policy or
indemnity contract to cover actual loss if its Trust Deed was
not in a first lien position on the property.
Neither Guardian nor USLife disputed before the trial court
that such contract was properly issued and in full force and
effect; and in fact, protected American against loss, actually
flowing from a defect in the title of security interest.

In

fact, as pointed out previously, USLife paid the amount that it
believed was properly due and owing for the claim.

The amount

that would have discharged the lien that should have been junior
to American's position.

Whether or not USLife had a greater

liability under the policy is not usually or customarily the
function of the agent to determine nor the responsibility of the
agent to insure or guarantee.
This rule has its foundation in good sense and reason. An
examination of the Title 31A insurance provisions, that American
is so eager to point to, will support the proposition that the
requirements

on

financial

responsibility

for

an

insurer,

overwhelm and greatly exceed any requirements upon an agent, who
can only act by specific appointment for an insurer.

There can

be no doubt that American did not rely upon Guardian's financial
strength and ability to guarantee or assure it that the title
position that it wished to have insured would be protected
against loss. Obviously, title insurance agents, as with all
other insurance agents, are smaller generally in size and scope
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and may even be comprised of classes of individuals that come
and

go without

However,

significant

insurers

event

are expected

in the

insurance

field.

to be the deep-pocket and

expected to be the parties responsible to make good on losses or
claims.
As pointed out before in this Brief, the trial court, as
evidenced by its Memorandum Decisions (Appendix to Appellant's
Brief) made no distinction and offered no rationale for holding
Guardian

liabile

on

the

insurance

contract

with

USLife.

Clearly, the trial court did not consider any factual questions
that might independently imply or suggest that Guardian had any
duties or was liable, independently of USLife, whether in tort
or otherwise.

In this regard, 4, Couch on Insurance, 2d

§26A:288, states:
When the agent of the insurer acts in an authorized
non-tortious manner, he is not personally liable to
the insured for his acts or for any contracts which
he makes on behalf of his disclosed principal. [Cited
cases omitted].
The few exceptions to this general policy have been noted,
separate tortious activity, failure to procure the insurance
contract, failure to disclose the principal.

Id. , §26A:289,

290, 292.
In this case, American makes some reference to the escrow
instructions that it admits were directed to Guardian and
USLife.

Guardian contends that the escrow instructions were

clearly directed to Guardian, as agent for USLife, rather than
in a separate capacity.

Such instructions, clearly refer to a
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commitment for title insurance and require that Guardian, on
behalf of USLife, takes such steps as are necessary to record
and insure the Trust Deed of American as a first lien upon the
subject property.

American contends that something more was

intended or implied by such instructions.
Essentially, American is suggesting that there should be
two contracts of insurance issued: one by Guardian, by virtue of
the escrow instructions, and another that Guardian was required
to issue, as agent for USLife, under the escrow instructions;
both of which were intended to accomplish the same purpose. The
problem

with

this

notion

is

that

there

was

no

separate

consideration whatsoever for Guardian assuming the obligation to
act as an insurer of the title, rather than acting as it did,
merely as a agent for USLife, which was the insurer.
The only consideration that American gave for its title
indemnity or insurance contract, was the title insurance premium
that was remitted for and on behalf of USLife.

Obviously,

Guardian shared in the premium, but it did so as an agent for
USLife under its own separate agency contract, which controls
and governs the amount of remuneration that Guardian would
receive by and through USLife. Where

no

separate

fee

or

consideration is given, there can be no separate obligation
arising apart from the title insurance contract, which was
expected. Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 82 (Idaho 1982).

18

POINT IV.
THE TITLE POLICY IS A CONTRACT OF
INDEMNITY AND AMERICAN'S CLAIMS ARE MERGED INTO AND
LIMITED TO THE CONTRACT.
American under Point II. A, of its Brief, argues that the
Title Policy was a contract of warranty rather than indemnity.
American appears to misapprehend when and how a distinction
between the two types of contracts occurs.

The distinction if

any, clearly depends upon the actual language of the contract.
In this case, the contract does not insure the title of an
owner, but instead insures the title of a lender, and by its
terms limits the company's (USLife's) liability to the actual
loss sustained by the insured, as a result of a defect, not to
exceed the maximum amount specified in the policy.

Indeed, the

cases cited by American for the proposition that it is a
contract

of

warranty,

do

not

even

attempt

to

make

the

distinction, but instead clearly support the proposition that
damages and claims are limited to the terms of the policy.
Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American Title Ins.
Co. , 749 P. 2d 651 (Utah 1988); see also, Espinoza v. Safeco
Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979).
American then launches into an analysis that really turns
upon the question of damages and when the same are sustained by
the insured, rather than relating to a distinction between the
nature of the contract as indemnity or warranty.

As pointed

out, the Utah cases make it clear that the terms of the contract
prevail, particularly

as they relate to a lender's policy
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against loss or damage sustained or incurred by reason of the
defect in the title.
This

distinction

determination

may

become

of the timing

Notwithstanding

the

trial

Insurance Law & Practice

and

more

amount

court's

apparent
of

quote

loss
from

in

the

incurred.
Appleman's

for the notion that a defect existing

at the outset constitutes a breach, there can be no covered
defect if it does exist at the outset, as already pointed out.
Thus, the more important matter is when must damages be paid and
what is the measure of such damages.

9, Appleman's Insurance

Law & Practice. §5216, states:
A title insurance policy is one of indemnity, so that
the insured is entitled to recover only the actual
loss which he has sustained by virtue of title
defects, encumbrances, and the like.
As pointed

out by Appleman's, ordinarily

damages are

measured by the difference between the value of the property
insured as it was with the defect insured against, and its value
as it would have been had there been no such defect.
§5216, p. 102.

Id. ,

Even in the event of a total loss of a

mortgage, as a result of sale under a prior mortgage in
existence on the date of the policy (the case here) , the insurer
is held liable only for the actual value of the land, if less
than the amount of the mortgage insured.

Id.. §5216, p. 109.

To the same effect is 15A, Couch on Insurance, 2d §57:179,
stating:
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Title insurance is solely a contract of
indemnity and the insured is entitled to recover only
his actual loss, and cannot make the contract one of
profit to him, recovery is limited to the amount
necessary to remove the title defect. Id., p. 198.
As stated in 15A, Couch on Insurance, 2d §57:189, with respect
to the insured interest of a mortgagee in the property, even
with a complete failure of the mortgagee's tile, if the value of
the mortgage property is less than the amount due on the
mortgage, it is generally held and recognized that the mortgagee
can recover only the value of the property, not the amount due
on the mortgage.

The rule is one of reason based on damages

generally, as stated:
The foregoing rule is based upon the nature of the
obligation undertaken by the insurer when it issues
a title policy, the policy insuring the title and not
the security; that is, it undertakes to indemnify
against loss or damage sustained by reason of defects
of title or liens upon the land, but it does not
guarantee that either the mortgage premises are worth
the amount of the mortgage or that the mortgage debt
will be paid. Id., p. 205.
The foregoing universal- statements regarding damages, are
based upon the sensible rule that the mortgagee should be
entitled to the benefit of its bargain, but no more.

In other

words, applying these rules to American's loan, there should be
no doubt that once the borrower filed bankruptcy (after two (2)
years of monthly payments on the secured indebtedness) and the
personal liability was discharged, then American could expect to
look only to the value of the security, with the reasonable
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expectation that it had a first lien secured by the property.
Thus, American cannot be entitled to more than the value of the
collateral and the proceeds that could be expected from the
liquidation

of such

collateral, as

is customarily

with a

commercial lender. Surely American expected no more under these
circumstances. It could not expect to obtain more than the face
amount of the policy and the original principal amount of the
indebtedness, solely because a title defect existed, which it
claims

it was unaware

proceedings.

of throughout

the

entirety

of its

Thus, it should not be able to achieve a windfall

benefit, but should only be restored to the position that it
would have been in, had title been as indemnified and insured.

POINT V.
GUARDIAN IS NOT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION OR FOR FRAUD,
American under Point III of its Memorandum, asserts that
Guardian and USLife are liable for negligent misrepresentation
citing as support, Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
Co. , 666 P. 2d 302 (Utah 1983) .

The case set forth the elements

of negligent misrepresentation, and found that Commonwealth was
liable

for

its

activities,

taken

as

an

escrow

agent,

specifically for affirmative representations that it made to a
lender respecting the subject matter of the escrow and the
release of lots thereunder.
The case is entirely distinguishable from the present case,
because Commonwealth was hired specifically for the handling of
an ongoing escrow involving the receipt of funds and release of
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lots,

for which

it was paid

continuing

escrow

fees.

In

contrast, the escrow that Guardian undertook, as agent for
USLife, in recording the Trust Deed of American and disbursing
the proceeds, was incidental to and a necessary part of the
issuance of the title insurance contract insuring American's
lien as a first and paramount lien, which was the primary object
of the escrow.
In the Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title case, there
was no privity of contract between the lender to whom the
representation as to the status of the lots was made, but
Commonwealth specifically acknowledged the status in writing,
and knew that the lender would rely upon the same.
In this case, Guardian had issued a commitment for title
insurance to United Savings, and as pointed out before, even if
it were viewed as an abstract of title, it was absolutely
correct and without fault whatsoever.

American did not request

any updated title report immediately prior to closing, or at any
time prior to closing, nor after the closing.

Instead, it

requested

the

under

the

fair

interpretation

of

escrow

instructions, is a title policy insuring the Trust Deed as a
first lien, and this is exactly what Guardian did on behalf of
USLife.

Thus, there was clearly privity of contract here, and

under such circumstances, the contract as contemplated by the
parties, governs and controls the claims respecting liability
and measurement of loss or damages, just as the parties expected
and bargained. This is certainly Utah law, as clearly expressed
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in the Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. National American
Title Ins, Co, case, the Valley Bank & Trust Co, v. USLife Title
Ins, Co,, 776 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1989), and is consistent with
the holding in Culp Construction,
The

escrow

instructions

specifically

reference

the

commitment for title insurance, and the commitment by its terms
incorporates the form of policy
accordance with the commitment.

intended to be

issued in

The policy that was issued

conformed to the commitment and expectation of American, and
contained a provision under §11, that is commonly referred to as
an integration/merger clause.

It states in pertinent part that

liability is limited to the policy and that any claim of loss or
damage, whether or not based on negligence, which arises out of
the status of the lien of the mortgage or the title to the
estate or interest covered by the contract, or any action
asserting

such claim, is restricted

to the provisions and

conditions stipulated in the policy.
Guardian acted as a clear and disclosed agent for USLife
in issuing both the commitment (which incorporated the form of
policy and §11 integration/merger clause), and in issuing the
policy which insured the mortgage of American, as requested and
directed

in

the

escrow

instructions,

incorporating

commitment and form of policy by reference.

the

Since Guardian

signed the contract, as it was authorized to do on behalf of
USLife, as USLife!s disclosed agent, it was surely intended that
the protection of the integration/merger clause under §11 of the
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policy, was intended to cover Guardian as well as USLife. This
is straight forward contract law and the favored approach, as
demonstrated by the foregoing cited cases, as well as Beck v.
Farmer's Insurance Exchange.
There is not even a hint that American cannot be made whole
under the direct terms of the contract, as the parties expected
and agreed.

The contract, expressly by its terms, indemnifies

American from actual loss it sustained, as a result of or
proximately caused by the defect in the title interest insured.
In this case, an argument and dispute has existed between
USLife, as the insurer and American, as to the extent of such
loss and the cause of such loss.
has vigorously

defended

As pointed out before, USLife

under the

issue

of mitigation of

damages, and has contended the factual issues are unresolved in
this regard.

Whatever the result of that dispute, nonetheless,

Guardian is not the party that contracted to insure or indemnify
American.
did

issue

Guardian acted as an agent as previously stated and
the

contract

of

insurance,

which

USLife

has

acknowledged was validly issued, and has relied upon in its
defense.
American, again under Point III., asserts that Guardian and
USLife committed a fraud upon American, apparently by having
issued

the contract

of title

insurance, as specified

and

required by American. American still doesn't seem to understand
the import of the Culp Construction case.

It held that neither

the commitment for title insurance, nor the title insurance
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policy constitute representations or reports, as to the status
of the title to the property.

To the contrary, it is just what

it purports to be, and what American expected it to be, a
contract of insurance.

If there was any merit at all to

American's claims that Guardian somehow undertook the additional
duty to insure title, in its own separate capacity rather than
under the Title Policy that it issued for USLife, then such
questions did not form the basis for the trial court's decision,
and are extremely

factually sensitive and preclude summary

judgment, at least against Guardian, as noted in the Culp
Construction case.

POINT VI, AMERICAN'S CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL OR STRICT
LIABILITY AS A RESULT OF THE ALLEGED ACTION OF
COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES IS WHOLLY WITHOUT MERIT,
American asserts under Point II, Subparts "E." and "F.",
of its Memorandum, that Guardian and USLife are estopped from
denying coverage and/or liability of the policy by virtue of the
purported

contacts

or

communications

Guardian and counsel for American.

between

counsel

for

This position is urged,

presumably as an alternative basis for affirming the trial
court's judgment.

The trial court, of course, found liability

under the contract and made no findings respecting the hotly
disputed factual issue which counsel for American has raised.
The factual statements made by Mr. Perry are directly
contradicted by Mr. Mabey's Affidavit, particularly f4. thereof.
(Record, p. 526-530).

Even Mr. Perry's statements about the
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letter appended as Exhibit "G" from Guardian's counsel, do not
appear accurate and don't support the claims that American is
making.

The discussion, as represented by Mr. Perry, turned on

possible remedial actions that could be taken, rather than the
factual basis for the claim under the policy.
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Perry's claim that Mr. Mabey led
him to believe he was undertaking in some confidential fashion,
the legal representation of American in the remedial efforts,
the letter that was sent at the outset of the conversations, in
response to the claim

letter of American

(Exhibit

M !!

G

to

American's Brief) states in the first paragraph that Mr. Mabey
represents Guardian, and does not suggest that he represents
USLife.

It also makes clear in the third paragraph that the

remedial action that was taken on behalf of American was done
under

reservation

of rights respecting

defenses under the

Policy; and on the second page, specifically advises American
that its counsel is Lester Perry, who is receiving copies of the
pleadings and to whom inquiries should be made by American.
This certainly doesn't suggest any surprise or advantage
was taken of Mr. Perry, and Mr. Perry doesn't suggest how his
conversation with Mr. Mabey created prejudice to him or to
American.

In any event, American's claim in this regard is an

attempt to enforce liability under the contract, and such
liability is upon the insurer, USLife, and not upon the agent,
Guardian.

The defense respecting the discussions of counsel,

are clearly fraught with material factual dispute and cannot
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serve as the basis for a summary judgment against Guardian.

POINT VII. AMERICAN IS ENTITLED TO THE ACTUAL LOSS
THAT IT SUSTAINED BY REASON OF THE TITLE DEFECT,
American argues under Point IV, that American is entitled
to recovery of the entire amount of the debt, together with
interest, without

regard

to the value

of the collateral.

Guardian has already pointed out in its Appellant's Brief and
under Point II herein, that American's position is incorrect and
the trial judge erroneously determined damages on the basis of
the full indebtedness, even in excess of the face amount on the
insurance policy.
Judge Moffat cited Appleman's in support of his erroneous
assessment

of

damages, but

Appleman's

is

clearly

to

the

contrary. 9, Appleman's Insurance Law & Practice, §520, states:
In no way, however, does a title insurance policy
guarantee the validity of the mortgage debt, the note
on which it is based, nor good faith of a vendor—its
concern being with the title, rather than any
indebtedness. [Numerous case citations omitted]. Id. ,
p. 3 5 and 36.
American contends that it would not have allowed the loan
to close and its money disbursed, if American had known of the
defect that occurred in its lien position.

This would seem

obviously to be true in all situations in which title insurance
is issued.

In fact it makes up the whole point for the

indemnity contract.

In other words, if the parties did not

contemplate the possibility that a prior encumbrance of record
may be missed, or that a defect in the title could occur or
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exist as of the date of the recordation of American's lien, then
there would be no reason for the title insurance contract
because there would be nothing to protect against.
If Guardian would have known about the existence of the
Scenic Rail trust deed, at the time it recorded the lien of
American and disbursed the loan proceeds, it surely would not
have done so.

Again this seems obvious in all situations; if

there is an actual defect that gives rise to the purpose for the
insurance contract or policy, then the insurer or its agent
would rather have avoided the potential or actual loss that
would later flow from the defect.
Nonetheless, neither Guardian nor USLife intended to or
became loan underwriters with American.

There should be no

doubt that American relied not only upon its security in the
real property, but also upon the credibility of the borrowers,
demonstrated from past loan performance and other financial
information. Guardian was not privy to any such information and
there is no suggestion in the escrow instructions that Guardian
or USLife had any duty to evaluate the borrowers1 ability to pay
or to do anything other than to insure the title or take steps
to put the title in a position where it can be insured as a
first lien.
American does not dispute that if USLife had paid off the
Scenic Rail trust deed, at any time prior to the Trustee's
foreclosure sale by Scenic Rail, that American would have had
exactly what it bargained for, a first lien upon the property
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and a right to resort to the collateral. The peculiar fact that
the borrower, after faithfully making monthly payments for two
years, had an adverse financial turn and declared bankruptcy, is
an expectation and likelihood that can occur with any loan; and
something, no doubt, that American was familiar with by its own
loan underwriting experience. This certainly was not caused by
the defect in the insured lien title, in fact it was entirely
independent and had nothing whatsoever to do with it.
The balance due on the indebtedness at the time of the
first default of the borrower, on February 1, 198 6, was in
excess of the original loan principal amount and the face amount
of the policy.

This was the amount Judge Moffat used and then

accrued interest at the high loan rate of 12 3/4% thereafter,
all without regard to the value of the collateral, or even the
date of loss of the secured lien.
In fact the secured lien was not lost until more than a
year later, even though interest was accruing in excess of
twelve percent (12%) on the loan during this entire time; and it
would not have been recoverable due to the lower fair market
value of the collateral.
value

of the

collateral

At least, Guardian contends that the
was

not more

than

$70,000.00 to

$75,000.00, at the date it was lost as security for the loan
(February 1987) ; and American has offered no competent evidence,
otherwise.
If American's title would have been exactly as insured,
then it would have had to complete a foreclosure sale, that it
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was apparently not even pursuing, despite the default for a
year; and then, after it vested itself in title to the property,
it would have been required to liquidate the collateral and
would typically have incurred selling expenses, including a real
commission in doing so.

All of this would not have been

accomplished sooner than a few months, on a typical basis.
There is nothing in the title insurance contract or in any
other documents or express or implied in the relationship that
remotely suggests that because of the title defect, the risk of
loss of the indebtedness

is totally

shifted to the title

insurer, and certainly it is not shifted to the agent. Even if
American could muster a sufficient factual basis for a claim,
arising out of an independent duty of Guardian to have properly
abstracted

the title, it would not then be an action in

contract, it would surely be in tort as American contends.
Under these circumstances, the damages would still be the
actual loss American sustained; and this certainly does not
ignore the facts and circumstances involved, including the value
of the collateral, which was the only thing American could
expect to look to, once the borrowers were discharged of
personal liability by their bankruptcy, which had nothing to do
with any duties undertaken by Guardian.
American, at best view, is entitled to the benefit of its
bargain, and that is to have USLife discharge the insured
obligation (assuming arguendo that mitigation of damages is not
an issue) by paying the difference between the value of the
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collateral, at the date of loss, less typical liquidation
expenses experienced by American in its business which were
avoided.

This matter must be tried as contended by both

Guardian and USLife before the trial court, since no evidence on
the fair market value was offered.

CONCLUSION
American has failed to offer a reasonable substantive basis
for its claim that liability should be found, otherwise, than
under the express and clear terms of the title insurance
contract that it accepted and made with USLife. The case law in
Utah, as well as the treatises, overwhelmingly support liability
founded upon the express terms of the contract; particularly
where there is no showing of disadvantage to American in being
limited to recovery of its actual damages, as opposed to a
windfall that has no relationship to the loss it would have
sustained, notwithstanding the title defect.
Guardian acted solely as an agent for the insurer and
undertook

no

special

or

separate

duties

not

merged

and

integrated into the insurance contract, by the express terms of
§11 thereof. While Guardian may be liable to USLife, that issue
is not the subject matter of the judgment, and is still a
pending issue before the trial court.

It is, nonetheless, not

liable to American, who is entitled to recompense from USLife
for its actual damage that must be proved by evidence.
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If there were any doubt at all respecting Guardian's acting
merely as an agent for USLife, then any alleged other duties
would

be a matter

of material

susceptible to summary judgment.

factual

determination, not

Moreover, no separate duties

were considered by the trial court and none formed the basis for
the trial court's judgment, which was based solely on the
contract and did not even suggest a reason for Guardian's
liability jointly with USLife.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3rd day of October, 1990.

-2^a^

L. BENSON MABEY^
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey
Attorneys for Defendant,
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I had four (4) true
and correct copy of the REPLY BRIEF AND RESPONDENT BRIEF OF
APPELLANT and CROSS-RESPONDENT GUARDIAN TITLE by depositing the
same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, this 3rd day of October,
1990:
Lester A. Perry
KESLER & RUST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Stephen S. Durish
of Travis County, Texas
P.O. Box 2800
Austin, TX 78762-2800
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ADDINBUM "A"
Lester A. Perry - A2571
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN,
KESLER & SWINTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
19 West South Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-1100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff

)
]i
))
)
])

vs.

]

AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a California
corporation,

USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF DALLAS a/k/a TITLE
USA INSURANCE CORPORATION,.a
Texas corporation and GUARDIAN
TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH, a Utah
corporation,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]
]) Civil No. C87-4811
]
]) Judge Richard F. Moffat
]

Defendants.
Plaintiff,

American

Savings

and

Loan

Association

("American"), hereby submits the following memorandum of points and
authorities in support of its motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this motion only, the plaintiff submits
that the uncontested facts are as follows:
1.

M. Lynn Strong and Cherie G. Strong owned a single

family residence located at 7629 South 835 East, Midvale, Utah (the

"Property").

(USLife Cross-Claim Paragraph 7 and Guardian Title

Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraph 3.)
2.

On December 30, 1983, the Strongs obtained a loan in

the amount of $31,300.00 from Scenic Rail Credit Union ("Scenic
Rail").

Scenic Rail secured the loan with a trust deed on the

property which trust deed was entitled "Second Trust Deed".

This

trust deed was recorded on February 14, 1984 in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office.

(USLife Cross-Claim Paragraph 7 and Guardian

Title Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraph 3.)
3.

The Strongs thereafter approached United Savings and

Loan Association ("United") for a loan secured by the Property.
United brokered the loan to FCA Mortgage Corporation ("FCA").
was acting on behalf of its parent, American.

FCA

The loan from

American was to be for $81,400.00 with interest of 12.75% per annum
and was to be secured by a first trust deed on the Property.
(Complaint Paragraph 6; Guardian Title Answer Paragraph 5; Killpack
Deposition Pages 18 and 19; Anderson Deposition Pages 24 through 31;
Exhibit

1, Page

532, Line

810 (Closing

Statement),

Anderson

Deposition.)
4.
corporation,

Guardian Title Company of Utah ("Guardian") is a Utah
doing business

authorized title agent.

in Utah

as a duly qualified and

(Complaint Paragraphs 3 and 5; Guardian
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Title Answer Paragraphs 1 and 3; Title Policy which is Exhibit "A"
of Complaint.)
5.

Guardian represented USLife Title Insurance Company of

Dallas, aka Title USA Insurance Company, ("USLife") as its agent.
Guardian and USLife had executed a Contract of Agency, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", which granted the following
authority to Guardian:
(a)

to issue title insurance commitments and title

insurance policies up to a $300,000 policy limit (Section I);
(b)

to examine the title of the property insured to

determine any and all express exceptions and exclusions from the
policy such as the Scenic Rail trust deed (Section II);
(c)

to correctly reflect tne condition of the title on

the title insurance commitments and title policies (Section III);
(d)

to collect premiums and pay USLife its share of

twenty percent (20%) as an "underwriting risk" premium (Sections IV
and V); and
(e)

to properly and regularly close the transaction on

which the commitment or policy was predicated (Section VI).
Cross-Claim

Paragraph

2 and Exhibit

"B" to said

(USLife

Cross-Claim;

Guardian Title Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraph 1.)
6.

Guardian and USLife were chosen to examine the state

of the title on the Property, to close the loan between the Strongs
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and American, to act as escrow and closing agent, to take possession
of $81,400,00 in loan proceeds from American, and to disburse the
proceeds

according to written escrow/closing

instructions from

American, and to issue a title policy for $81,400.00 insuring
American's trust deed as a first position lien on the Property.

The

closing was held and Guardian recorded American's trust deed on
March 14, 1984 in the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office.

On or about March 23, 1984, Guardian and USLife issued a

title policy insuring American's trust deed in first position, a
copy of said policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". (Complaint
Paragraphs 6 and 7; USLife's Answer Paragraphs 6 and 7; Guardian
Title's Answer Paragraphs 2 and 3; USLife Cross-Claim Paragraphs 3,
4, 5 and 6; and Guardian Title's Answer to Cross-Claim Paragraphs 1
and 2 ) .
7.
were governed

The closing, escrow ani disbursal of loan proceeds
by written Escrow Instructions

from American to

Guardian and USLife that the policy wa« to insure the American Trust
Deed as a "first and paramount lien of record" and "pay off any and
all liens on the subject property" ahead of American's trust deed, a
copy of said instructions are attached hereto as Exhibit "C".

The

instructions were received and acknowledged in writing by Guardian's
escrow/closing officer, Ms. Fay Anderson.

(Anderson Deposition Page

48 and Deposition Exhibit 1, Pages 533 and 534 of said Exhibit).
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8.

During the title search of the Property and prior to

closing, Guardian became aware of the Scenic Rail loan and trust
deed that, even though it was entitled

"Second Trust Deed", was

superior to the trust deed of American that would be recorded at
closing.

(Complaint Paragraphs 23 and 38; Guardian Title Answer

Paragraphs 19 and 26; USLife Answer Paragraphs 14 and 23; Anderson
Deposition Pages 31 through 46 (particularly pages 45 and 46) and
Exhibit 2 of said deposition; Killpack Deposition Page 22.)
9.

Notwithstanding

the clear escrow instructions of

American, Guardian and USLife closed the American loan even though
the Scenic Rail trust deed was superior in priority to American's
trust deed.

Guardian's closing officer, Ms. Anderson, knew that the

Scenic Rail trust deed would have to be paid off from American's
loan proceeds, but failed to do so.

The title policy showing

American in a first priority position, without mention of the Scenic
Rail trust deed, was issued by Guardian and USLife on or about March
23, 1984, approximately one week after closing.

However, prior to

signing the policy, Ms. Anderson became aware that the loan proceeds
from American, that should have been used to pay off Scenic Rail,
were mistakenly disbursed by her office to the Strongs.
Rail trust deed had not been paid off.

The Scenic

Ms. Anderson advised her

superiors, including Ms. Killpack, Guardian's vice-president and
office manager, and Mr. Warren Curlis, Guardian's president and
5

owner.

These individuals, as employees of Guardian, and as agent of

USLife, consciously chose to issue and sign the title policy showing
American in first position.

They did so clearly aware of their

liability to American and the representation in the policy that
American was in first position.

The policy was signed and sent to

American in Stockton, California showing its trust deed in a first
position and not mentioning in any manner the Scenic Rail trust
deed.

(Anderson Deposition Pages 51 through 54 and Exhibit "8" of

Anderson Deposition.)
10.

American was under the belief that the loan was

closed as it had instructed, i.e., that its trust deed was in a
first priority position.

USLife, its agent Guardian, and Guardian's

officers and employees, chose not to advise American that its lien
was in second priority behind Scenic Rail for they realized Guardian
and USLife were liable to American under the policy.

(Anderson

Deposition Pages 53, 62 and 63 and Killpack Deposition Pages 30 and
32. )
11.

Guardian and USLife tried to cover up the problem by

not notifying American of what had happened, by contacting the
Strongs to coerce their payment of the Scenic Rail trust deed, and
by contacting Scenic Rail to obtain a subordination agreement.

The

Strongs told Guardian that they could not immediately pay off the
Scenic Rail trust deed because the windfall they had mistakenly

6

received at closing had been put into "investments"-

Scenic Rail

refused to sign a subordination agreement because the property was
not worth enough to secure both the American loan and its loan.
These conversations took place for approximately one to two months
after

the closing,

i.e.,

April

and May of

1984.

(Anderson

Deposition Pages 54 through 61 and Killpack Deposition Pages 24
through 28.)
12.

No further effort was made to resolve the problem by

Guardian or USLife or to notify American of the problem.

No one at

Guardian felt it was their responsibility to obtain release of the
Scenic Rail trust deed.

Nor was there any attempt to monitor the

Strongs timely payment of the monthly installments under the Scenic
Rail note and trust deed.

(Anderson Deposition Pages 61 through 63,

Killpack Deposition Pages 24 through 32.)
13.

Notwithstanding the fact that Guardian and USLife

knew that they could have recorded a Request for Notice pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26, requesting notice of any foreclosure
proceeding by Scenic Rail, they failed to do so.

Instead, Guardian

and USLife concluded that if Scenic Rail foreclosed, they would rely
upon American to contact them and advise them of the foreclosure.
Yet, Guardian and USLife refused to notify American of the Scenic
Rail trust deed so that American would not file a claim under the
title policy.

(Killpack Deposition Pages 28 through 31.)
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14.

On February 1, 1986, the Strongs defaulted on their

loan with American•

At that time, the balance due to American was

$80,939.35 principal, together with accrued interest and reserve
fund shortage of $1,712.16.
15.

(Affidavit of American.)

On August 8, 1986, the Strongs filed a Chapter 7

bankruptcy petition and obtained a full discharge of their assets
without

payment of dividends to any unsecured

American.

creditors or to

Their bankruptcy was a "no asset" case.

(Complaint

Paragraphs 9 and 11; Affidavit of American.)
16.
American's
Property.

Shortly

loan,

after

American

the

default

commenced

of

the

foreclosure

Strongs on
against

the

The foreclosure was stayed by the Strong's bankruptcy.

In conjunction with the foreclosure, American's trustee, Mr. Lester
A. Perry of Kirton, McConkie £ Bushnell, obtained a foreclosure
report from another title company listing the Scenic Rail trust deed
as a "Second Trust Deed".

A meticulous review of the foreclosure

report would have revealed that the recording date of the Scenic
Rail trust deed was prior to the recording date of American's trust
deed.

However, this fact was not noticed because the trust deed was

listed as a "Second Trust Deed" and an inspection of the USLife
title policy indicated that American's trust deed was in a first
position.

It was believed that the Scenic Rail trust deed was in

8

fact a "Second Trust Deed".

(Perry Deposition Page 18; Burns

Deposition Pages 21 and 49.)
17.

The Strongs also defaulted on their loan with Scenic

Rail and foreclosure was commenced on its trust deed by recording a
Notice of Default on October 20, 1986.

The Strongs' bankruptcy also

delayed completion of that foreclosure.

A notice of default and

notice of sale were prepared and recorded by Scenic Rail's trustee
and the Property was sold at trustee's sale for $30,000.00 on
February 23, 1987 to United Bond Finance Corp. ("United Bond").
(Complaint Paragraph 12; Guardian Title Answer Paragraph 10; USLife
Answer Paragraph 6; Wolfert Deposition Pages 26 and 27.)
18.

American and its trustee received

copies of the

Scenic Rail Notice of Default and Notice of Sale.

Mr. Perry's

office checked the title policy issued by Guardian and USLife and
determined that American's trust deed was in first position.

Thus,

Mr. Perry and American believed that a second trust deed or junior
trust deed was foreclosing and was not concerned that American's
trust deed would be foreclosed out.
the

fact

that American's

trustee

This belief was supported by
had ordered

and received a

foreclosure report from a third party title company
foreclosure of American's trust deed.

to aid in

This foreclosure report

indicated that the Scenic Rail trust deed was a "Second Trust Deed".
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(Perry Deposition Pages 37, 47 and 48; Burns Deposition Pages 21 and
49. )
19.

During American's

foreclosure sale, American was

notified by a third-party title company who was searching for
federal

tax

liens that

its interest

foreclosed by Scenic Rail.

in the property had been

American immediately notified Guardian

and USLife by letter dated March 9,

1987 of the Scenic Rail

foreclosure and demanded payment of the full amount of the title
policy plus interest because of the complete failure of American's
trust deed.

A copy of said demand letter is attached hereto as

Exhibit "D".
American.

Guardian and USLife have refused to pay any sums to

USLife has offered a judgment for $27,131.19.

However,

acceptance of this judgment is contingent upon settlement in full by
American.

(Perry Deposition Page 15; Complaint Paragraph 16 and

Exhibit "C" to Complaint; Guardian Title Answer Paragraph 14; USLife
Answer Paragraph 10.)
20.

Mr. L. Lynn Mabey, a Utah attorney,

immediately

called American's counsel, Mr. Perry, to discuss the claim made by
American.

Mr. Mabey indicated that he felt it would be prudent for

him, as counsel for American, to file a state court action to set
aside the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and to file an action in the
Strongs' bankruptcy to reopen the bankruptcy and object to the
discharge

of American's

debt.
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During

the course of several

conversations between March 9, 1987 and March 18, 1987, Mr. Mabey
and Mr. Perry fully discussed the facts that were then unfolding.
They also considered strategy and legal theories of recovery.

These

discussions were held because of the express representation of Mr.
Mabey that he was the title company's attorney hired to represent
American.

Mr. Mabey filed the state court action and the motion to

reopen the Strongs' bankruptcy purporting to represent American.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is the front page of the state court
Complaint filed by Mr. Mabey for his "client", American.

Mr. Mabey

confirmed his legal representation of American as its attorney by
letter of March 13, 1987 to Ms. Leila Brand, an employee and officer
of American.
"F".

A copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit

On April 17, 1987, Mr. John T. Anderson sent a letter to Ms.

Brand, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "G", indicating
that he represented the title insurer and that Mr. Mabey was not
authorized to represent American.

This letter was one month after

full and open discussions between Mr. Mabey and Mr. Perry concerning
the facts and legal strategy of American.

Mr. Anderson, thereafter,

forced Mr. Mabey to dismiss the state court action and cease any and
all

representation

bankruptcy actions.

of American in either the state court or
On July 6, 1987, Mr. Anderson sent a letter to

Mr. Perry's law firm denying coverage of American under the policy.
A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "H".
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This

denial was based upon the discussions between Mr. Mabey and Mr.
Perry

while Mr. Mabey purported

to represent

American.

Mr.

Anderson's letter clearly admits that USLife's defenses were founded
upon these discussions.

American filed the present lawsuit and Mr.

Mabey and Mr. Anderson appeared
Guardian and USLife.
21.

as counsel for the defendants,

(Perry Affidavit.)

American has incurred $28,819.50 attorneys fees and

$1,134.76 costs of court in prosecution of this action through the
date of this memorandum, which fees were necessary and reasonable.
(Perry Affidavit.)
22.

The amount due to American under the Strong loan on

February 1, 1986, the date the Strongs defaulted on their loan with
American, was $82,651.51 including interest, late fees and reserve
shortage.

The amount due to American on the date that Scenic Rail

completed

its foreclosure, February

23, 1987, was $95,380.15,

including interest, late fees and reserve shortage.

(Affidavit of

American.)
23.

The fair market value of the property on the date of

American's loan was $90,500.00, well in excess of the amount loaned
to the Strongs (Affidavit of American).
24.

After the present lawsuit was filed, the parties took

the deposition of a Mr. Mark A. Wolfert, who acted as trustee for
Scenic Rail in its foreclosure.
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In the deposition, Mr. Wolfert
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STATE OF U T A H

AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN
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D E F E N D A N T GUARDIAN TITLE
COMPANY'S MEMORANDUM
IN O P P O S I T I O N TO
PLAINTIFF'S M O T I O N FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
-vsU S LIFE TITLE INSURANCE
C O M P A N Y OF DALLAS aka TITLE
USA INSURANCE CORPORATION, a
Texas corporation, and
GUARDIAN T I T L E C O M P A N Y OF
U T A H , a Utah corporation,

Civil N o . C-87-4811
Assigned

to Judge Moffat

Defendants.

Defendant Guardian Title Company
the following m e m o r a n d u m
for Summary

in opposition

("Guardian") submits

to Plaintiff's Motion

Judgment:
R E S P O N S E T O S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS

For the purposes of responding to Plaintiff's M o t i o n ,

y».WV

2
and Statement of Facts only, Guardian submits the following
(paragrpah numbers correspond
Plaintiff's memorandum
1.

Undisputed.

2.

Undisputed.

3.

Disputed.

to the numbered paragraphs in

in support):

Guardian disputes Plaintiff's

statement

that "The Strongs thereafter approached United Savings for a
loan..." (Emphasis added).
issued by Guardian was

The commitment

insurance

issued on the effective date, December

14, 1983, to United Savings as proposed
documents-commitment

for title

insured

(see Exhibit 1

specifically marked as page 526 and 527 to

Anderson deposition and see Anderson deposition, pages 30 and
31).

The commitment

and testimony of Fay Anderson

specifically Plaintiff's allegation

controverts

that the Strongs

approached

United Savings after they had obtained a loan from Scenic
Rail.

They had obviously approached United Savings prior to

obtaining

the loan.

Moreover, the only commitment

purportedly showed the status of the title was
the date that the Strongs obtained
(December

The December

commitment
appears

issued prior to

the Scenic Rail

loan

30, 1983) and a substantial amount of time prior to

the recording of the Scenic Rail
1984).

which

trust deed

(February 14,

14, 1983 commitment was the only

obtained prior

to the subject

loan closing and

to have been accurate based on the condition of the

^'JOr,.V;
i
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title at the time the commitment was issued.

Guardian does not

dispute that the loan was apparently brokered by United to
"FCA" nor that the loan was

intended

to be secured by a first

trust deed on the property.
4.

Undisputed.

5.

Disputed.

Guardian does not dispute that a true

copy of the written Contract of Agency
"Aff.

is appended as Exhibit

Guardian states that the contract

disputes any attempt by Plaintiff

speaks for itself and

to draw conclusions by

references to specific portions of the contract without
the entirety of the contract
6.

7.

in context.

Undisputed, subject

American, as used,

reading

to the qualification

that

is being treated as the successor

Undisputed, except

to FCA.

that Plaintiff's

characterization or interpretation of the Exhibit "C" escrow
instructions

is incorrect.

The escrow instructions

proof of payment of the encumbrances
commitment which

require

set forth in the

is referenced by its date of December

14, 1983

issued to United Savings and requires further

that Guardian

take such steps as to cause the title company

(U.S. Life) to

issue a policy insuring American's

trust deed as a first

lien

on the property.
8.

Disputed.

The closing officer, Fay Anderson, who

was charged with the responsibility and duty of making

disbursements and handling the loan closing, did not become
consciously aware that the Scenic Rail

loan was still

outstanding and secured by a valid and subsisting
until after

the loan closing and disbursement

(see Anderson deposition, pages 49-51).
to its paragraphs

in the complaint

plainly do not support

trust deed

of loan proceeds

Plaintiff's

and Guardian's

reference

answer

the claim made by Plaintiff

in paragraph

8.
9.

Disputed.

Guardian disputes

that

its closing

officer, M s . Anderson, consciously knew or became aware that
the Scenic trust deed and loan was still outstanding
after
8).

the closing and disbursement of loan proceeds
Guardian does not dispute that

insuring American's
prior commitment

until
(see No.

it issued the title policy

trust deed as a first as required under

the

and the escrow instructions, nor does Guardian

dispute that between the date of the loan closing and after

the

disbursement of loan proceeds Guardian became aware that the
Scenic trust deed was still outstanding and the loan had not
been paid off and realized

that a mistake had been made.

Guardian disputes the statement made by Plaintiff
policy represents

that American was

in a first

Guardian does not dispute that the policy
trust deed as a first

that the

position.

insures American's

lien.

k ;•• VJK:
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10.

Disputed.

American was under
instructed.

Guardian disputes the claim that

the belief

that

its loan was closed as

Guardian has no idea what American's belief was

and nothing referenced by Plaintiff

in support of this

statement acts as evidence or provides an evidentiary basis for
such statement.

Guardian does not dispute that

it did not

advise American of the Scenic Rail trust deed once it had
discovered on a conscious
outstanding and recorded
11.

Disputed.

level that such trust deed was still
first

in time.

Guardian disputes

the statement

Guardian and U.S. Life tried to "cover up the problem.11
such evidentiary support
Plaintiff.
Strongs

is referenced

to obtain their agreement

subordination
12.

the

to pay off the

Scenic trust deed, nor does Guardian dispute that
Scenic Rail Credit union and attempted

No

for such conclusion by

Guardian does not dispute that it contacted

in an attempt

that

it contacted

to obtain a

agreement.
Undisputed, except Plaintiff's statement

one at Guardian felt that it was their responsibility

that no
to obtain

a release.
13.

Disputed.

Guardian admits

that Ms. Killpack was

familiar with the Utah Code provision cited which permits the
recording of a request

for notice.

However, she stated

in her

deposition that she did not think of or consider using such

6
procedure.

M s . Killpack also testified that she expected that

Guardian would be notified by reason of its having been a
designated

trustee under the FCA-American

trust deed by virtue

of the customary practice of providing a notice of default to
the trustee on a junior trust deed.
14.

Undisputed.

15.

Undisputed.

16.

Disputed.

commenced

Guardian does not dispute that American

foreclosure proceedings after the default of the

Strongs, nor that American's counsel substituted himself as
trustee under the trust deed.

Guardian does not dispute that

one foreclosure report obtained by Mr. Perry referenced
title of the Scenic Rail

the

trust deed as a second trust deed.

Guardian disputes Plaintiff's claim that only a "meticulous
review of the foreclosure report" would have revealed
Scenic trust deed was prior
trust deed.

that

the

in recording date to the American

Guardian also disputes Plaintiff's claim that it

did not notice that the Scenic Rail
first and disputes
Rail was a second
notwithstanding

its claim that
trust deed.

trust deed was

it believed

recorded

that the Scenic

Guardian disputes such facts

that Mr. Perry and M s . Burns have said

in their

testimony that they did not notice or realize that the Scenic
Rail

trust deed was recorded

first.

Perry also shows that they understood

The testimony of Burns and
that

it was customary for

7
a foreclosure report to list liens and encumbrances

in the

order which they were recorded and that the Scenic Rail
deed was listed before the American
foreclosure report.
through

trust

trust deed on the

The issue of whether or not American,

its separate officers or through Mr. Perry and Ms.

Burns as their counsel and trustee, knew or noticed

the

recording dates and the order of listing of the trust deeds on
the foreclosure report

is a factual dispute and

is subject to

the trier of fact's determination based on reasonable
inferences to be drawn by testimony, the documents and other
facts to be offered at trial.

(See Perry deposition, pages 47

and 48, testimony by Mr. Perry that he received Scenic Rail's
notice of trustee's sale and remembers asking his paralegal
check and see if the Scenic Rail
out American's
17.

foreclosure would

to

foreclose

interest).

Undisputed, except

the amount

for which the

property was sold at the trustee's sale was less than
f28,000.00
18.

(see Wolfert
Disputed.

deposition).
Guardian does not dispute that American

and its counsel both received copies of Scenic Rail's notice of
default and notice of sale, and a foreclosure report

that

showed the recording dates for the respective trust deeds.
remainder of the factual statement
set forth under paragraph 16.

is disputed

The

for the reasons

8
19.

Disputed.

Guardian had heretofore thought

that

Mr. Perry and Ms. Burns first received notice of the
foreclosure sale of Scenic Rail when Guardian's

counsel

telephoned Mr. Perry on March 9, 1987 (see affidavit of L.
Benson Mabey).

Guardian admits that American

set forth as Exhibit

w

sent the letter

D n to Guardian dated March 9, 1987 which

it subsequently received on March

12, 1987.

Guardian

disputes

that U.S. Life refused to pay the amount actually bid for the
property at the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and
alleges that

it now understands

that the amount, together with
$29,957.30, was

affirmatively

that Mr. Perry also realizes
interest by a check for

in fact paid and accepted by Mr. Perry's

former

law firm.
20.

Disputed.

Guardian does not dispute the

authenticity of the documents set forth and referenced as
Exhibits "E", "F", "G" and "H".

Guardian disputes the alleged

claim that confidentiality had arisen or that Mr. Mabey
ascertained any factual

information under a claim of

representation or privilege
and see letter

(see affidavit of L. Benson Mabey

from Mr. Mabey attached as Exhibit "F" which

refers in part to the discussion and agreement between Mr.
Mabey and Mr. Perry that the state court action and bankruptcy
court motion were brought under reservation of rights and that
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copies of such pleadings would be furnished
was counsel
21.

to Mr. Perry who

for American),
Disputed.

Guardian has had no opportunity to

examine the time entries or conduct discovery

respecting

the

same (see affidavit of L. Benson M a b e y ) .
22.

Undisputed.

23.

Disputed.

The affidavit of American does not

comply with Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P. with respect

to the claim of

fair market value since there is no demonstration of
appropriate foundation.

Guardian also points out that the

value on such date is irrelevant
damages

to any claim of loss or

in these proceedings.
24.

Disputed.

The testimony and other factual matters

referred to in paragraph 24 are subject

to inconsistencies in

testimony and other documents and testimony
the same.

that conflict with

The trier of fact must hear the facts, weigh the

evidence, draw reasonable

inferences from the evidence and

weigh the credibility of witnesses after observation of such
test imony.
ARGUMENT

POINT 1.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE WHERE

THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.

